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IN THE SUPRE11E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-v-

Case 1lo. 16037

HILLIAH L. HUTCHINSOll,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDEilT

STATE11ENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The State of Utah, appellant herein, appeals from a
judgment of the District Court, Third Judicial District, the
Honorable David K. \linder presiding, which affirmed on appeal
a ruling of the City Court of Salt Lake City wherein Sections
1-10-4 and l-10-8 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County
(ROSLCO) were declared unconstitutional and void.
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELO!,.l
This matter came before the district court upon the
State's appeal of the city court ruling referred to above pursuant to the authority of Section 78-4-17(6) Utah Code Annotated (1953).

The district court, in a memorandum decision,

affirmed
the ruling of the city court (TR 49-50), finding
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Sections l-10-4 and l-10-8 of the ROSLCO unconstitutional and
void.
?ELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of
the district court and a ruling that Sections 1-10-4 and l-10-8
of the ROSLCO are unconstitutional and void.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In February of 1978, the respondent, Salt Lake County
Commissioner \villiam L. Hutchinson, was charged with two counts
of Failure to File Campaign Statements, in violation of Sections
1-10-4 and 1-10-8 of the ROSLCO.

The respondent filed a motion

to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Salt Lake County
was without authority to pass said ordinances.

The matter came

before the city court on April 11, 1978, with the Honorable
Melvin Morris presiding.

After hearing arguments from both par-

ties, Judge Morris ruled that Salt Lake County was without constitutional or statutory authority to pass Sections 1-10-4 and
1-10-3 of the ROSLCO, and therefore that said ordinances were
void, and the complaint was dismissed.

The State of Utah filed

its notice of appeal to the district court on the 26th of April,
1978.

On the 15th of September, 1978, the district court, the

Honorable David K. Winder presiding, entered its memorandum
decision affirming the city court's judgment, finding Sections
1-10-4 and 1-10-8 of the ROSLCO unconstitutional and void.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUME~T

POINT I
THE STATE OF UTAH HAS PREEl1PTED THE ENTI'li:
FIELD OF REGULATION IN t1ATTERS HlVOLVING
ELECTIONS.
In Title 20 of Utah Code Annotated (1953), as
amended, denoted "Elections," the State has expressly preempted
the regulation of all elections for public office in the following relevant particulars: the control of general elections (including all county elections) at Utah Code Annotated, Section
20-l-2; the regulation of countv conventions at Utah Code Annotated, Section 20-3-2(2); the selection of nominees for county
offices at Utah Code Annotated, Section 20-4-7; the regulation
of county election returns at Utah Code Annotated, Section
20-8-9.5; a broad range of election offenses (applicable to
county elections) at Utah Code Annotated, Section 20-13-l, et
seq.; and the regulation of election contests (encompassing
county elections) at Utah Code Annotated, Section 20-5-l, et
seq.
In addition, the State has enacted legislation dealing exclusively with the election of county commissioners: the
number of county commissioners at Utah Code Annotated, Section
17-5-l; the eligibility and election of candidates for county
commissioner at Utah Code Annotated, Section 17-5-2; and the
term of office for county commissioners at Utah Code Annotated,
Section 17-5-3.
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The State's only delegation of authority to counties
with respect to elections can be found in Section 17-5-18:
17-5-13.
[Election districts]-They may establish, abolish and
~hange election districts, appoint
~nspectors and judges of election,
canvass all election returns, except as otherwise provided by law,
may declare the result, order the
county clerk to issue certificates
of elections, and shall perform
such other duties in relation to
elections as are or may be prescribed by law.
They shall alter
or divide election districts whenever necessary in such manner that
each election district shall contain
not more than five hundred voters.
No precinct or election district
shall be established or abolished
or the boundaries of any precinct
or district altered or changed
within ninety days prior to any
election.
(Emphasis added.)
The statutory language "shall perform such other
duties in relation to elections as are or may be prescribed by
law" indicates that the Legislature intended to retain in itsel

all authority over county elections, leaving in the county the
power to perform only those duties that the Legislature expressly prescribes.

In other words, the State retains complete

power over elections, and the county has only those powers
specifically relinquished by the State.
The county ordinances involved in the instant case
are clearly outside of this statutory delegation.

The State
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has never expressly delegated to the counties the authority
to enact ordinances regulating campaign finances in county
elections, and the Salt Lake County Commission was in no
manner performing duties prescribed by law.
Further evidence of the State's intention to preempt
the regulation of elections can be found in Chapter 13 of
Title 20 of Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, entitled
"Election Offenses."

The scope of this chapter is found in

Section 20-13-20 and extends to county elections.
20-13-2.
[Chapter applicable to
all elections] .--The provisions
of this chapter shall extend so
far as applicable to all elections
provided by law, special, general,
municipal and school elections,
and to primary elections in c~t~es
of the first and the second class.
(Emphasis added.)
Section 20-13-l deals with bribery in elections:
20-13-l.
[Bribery in elections]
It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by himself
or through any other person:
(2) To give, offer or promise any
office, place or employment, or to
promise or procure, or endeavor to
procure, any office, place of employment, to or for any vote:, or
to or for any other person, ~n
order to induce such voter to vote
or refrain from voting at any
election provided by law; or to
induce any voter to refrain from
voting
at such election for any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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particular person or persons, or
to obtain the oolitical suoporror aid of anv such erson ~r oersons.
Emphasis added.
(3)
To advance or pav, or cause
to be Paid, any monev or other
valuable thing to, or for the use
of, anv other Person with the intent that the same, or any part
thereof, shall be used in briberv
at any election provided by law;
or to knowingly pay, or cause to
be paid, any money or other valuable thing to anv person in discharge or repaYQent of any money
expended ,.;holly or in part in
bribery ~t any such election.
(Emphasis added.)
The above statute allows the State to prosecute a
broad range of corrupt practices by candidates in all elections,
including the selling of favors through campaign contributions.
The appellant states in its brief that the ordinances
in question were in part designed to "assure that the financial
interests of candidates present no conflict with the public
trust."

Appellant's Brief, p. 7.

A conflict with the public

trust would occur only where the candidate promised employment
or some other qu·id pro quo to the contributor in exchange for
the contribution, and such conduct is subject to prosecution
by the State under Section 20-13-1(2).

Thus, the argument by

appellant that the ordinances in question are indisPensable to
protect the good order, etc. of the inhabitants is rendered
ineffective and without merit because the State can prosecute
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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J

candidate dishonesty through Chapter 13 of Title 20.

In addi-

tion, Section 20-13-l et seq. further exemplifies the State's
intention to preempt to itself the power to control corrupt
financial practices in all elections.
The appellant, ignoring the existence of Section
20-13-l et seq., argues that the State cut back on its preemption in the area of election finance regulations in enacting
the amended version of Section 20-14-l et seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended.

Section 20-14-l et seq., entitled

the "Currupt Practices in Elections Act," was initially enacted
in 1971 as a campaign financing disclosure statute applicable
to all candidates for public office in Utah except candidates
for the national offices of President and Vice President.

In

1973, the Legislature amended Section 20-14-l et seq. limiting
its application to candidates for the state offices of Governor,
Secretary of State/Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General.
It is appellant's contention (Appellant's Brief,
p. 9) that the 1973 amendment was intended to accomplish two
things:
(1)

To limit its application to candidates for the

three enumerated public offices and
(2)

To exempt all other public officials from its

application.
The appellant then argues that the purpose of this amendment
to bycut
onLibrary.
the Funding
preempted
and
thusof Museum
allow
local
Sponsored
the S.J.back
Quinney Law
for digitization area
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governments to enact their own campaign practices act.
The defendant suggests that the intent of the Legislature, in enacting the amended version of Section 20-14-1 et
seq., was to exclude local government candidates from the application of the type of regulations found in Chapter 14 of Title
20 and to have the election offenses regulations of Chapter 13
solely govern the conduct of local government candidates.

The

State never intended to relinquish its control over county
elections to the counties, it simply intended to modify its
control mechanism.

Therefore, since the county ordinances in

question involve the type of regulations found in 20-14-1 et
seq., the ordinances are in conflict with the Legislature's intent to exclude local government candidates from this type of
regulatory control.
The appellant cites Salt Lake Citv v. Kusse, 93 P.2d
671 (Utah 1938) and Salt Lake City v. Allred, 430 P.2d 371
(Utah 1967) to support its contention that when the State has
preempted an area, local governments can pass ordinances so
long as they are not inconsistent with the State statutes.
should be noted, however, that in both Kusse,

~.

It

and Allred,

supra, the statutes were upheld because the State had expressly
relinquished some of its preempted power to the local governments by statute through an express grant of power.

There has

been no express relinquishment of the State's power to control
elections in the instant case, and absent some express grant of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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authority from the State to the counties, the counties are
powerless to act in the preempted area.
In conclusion, Salt Lake County was wholly without
authority to enact the ordinances at issue in the instant case.
The State has preempted the entire field of election regulation,
and under Section 17-15-18 counties may only enact ordinances
dealing with county elections where such ordinances are in
performance of duties expressly prescribed by la>v.

The State

did not expressly relinquish its power to the counties to regulate election financing, and the ordinances in question were
not expressly prescribed by law.

Therefore, Sections l-10-4

and 1-10-8 of the ROSLCO are void based on Salt Lake County's
lack of authority to enact them.
POINT II
SALT LAKE COUNTY HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL OR
STATUTORY AUTHORITY, EITHER EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED TO PASS SECTIONS 1-10-4 AND 1-10-8
OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY.
The origin and extent of a county's power was dealt
with by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Cottonwood City
Electors v. Salt Lake Countv Board of Commissioners, 28 Utah
2d 121, 499 P.2d 270 (1972).

There the court stated:

The county is a political sub~ivi
sion of the state whose creat~on
and whose powers and duties are derived from the constitution and
statutory law.
(P. 271.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In other cases dealing with the county's relationship to the
state, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he county is
a part of the state and is subject to the control of the legislature," and that a "county is but an agency of the state, subservient to it."
Board of

Hansen v. Public Emolovee Retirement Systems

A~stration,

246 P.2d 591, 599 (Utah 1952); Salt

Lake County v. Liquor .Control Commission, ll Utah 2d 235, 357
p. 2d 488. 489 (1960).

In Cottonwood City Electors, suora, the court stated
further that:
[A county] has such powers as are
specifically enunciated by law and
those which are reasonably and
necessarily implied in order to
discharge those responsibilities.
(P. 271.)
The same position as that taken in Cottonwood City
Electors, supra, was applied to county commissioners in Carbon
County v. Hamilton, 48 Utah 503, 160 P. 765 (1916).

There the

court stated "that the doctrine that county commissioners can
exercise such po~ers only as are expressly or by necessary
implication conferred upon them by the statute is elementary."
Id. 768.
The Utah Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions
that political subdivisions can only exercise such powers as are
expressly granted to them and such other implied powers that are
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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indispensably necessary to carry out the express powers.

Salt

Lake City v. Allred, 19 Utah 2d 254, 430 P. 2d 371 (1967);
SteEhenson v. Salt Lake City CorE., 7 Utah 2d 28, 317 P.2d 597
(1957); Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d
702 (1955); American Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292
P. 249 (1930); Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 28 P.2d 161 (1933);
Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234 (1923).
In interpreting the extent of the power granted to
the political subdivision, it is the clear and

~-.rell

established

rule in this state that the court will strictly construe the
power granted.

A typical articulation of this position can be

found in Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d
701 (1955).

In that case the court stated:
This court has generally adhered
to a policy of rather strictly
limiting the extension of the
powers of a city by implication.
Id. 704.

The Utah Supreme Court has in no way backed away
from this position.

As recently as April 10, 1978, in the

case of Layton City v. SEeth, 578 P.2d 828 (1978), the court
reiterated its prior position quoting from Nesfell v. Ogden
City, 249 P.2d 507, 508 (1952) and stating that:
Grants of oower to cities are
strictly c~nstrued to the exclusion of implied powers not
reasonably necessary in carrying
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out the purposes of the express
powers granted.
Id. 829.
If, after strictly construing the statute, any doubt
remains as to the existence of the grant of power, the court
must deny the power.

This was aptly stated in the case of

Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, 150 P.2d 773 (Utah 1944).

There the

court stated:
To determine whether or not a city
has the power to enact any particular ordinance the court must look
to the legislative grant of power
and to the Constitution of the
State of Utah.
If there is a reasonable doubt concerning the existence
of a particular power, that doubt
should be resolved against the city,
and the power should be denied.
Id.
774. (Emphasis added.)
This position is also supported by Parker v. Provo City Corporation, 543 P.2d 769 (Utah 1975); Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden
City, 58 P.2d l

(Utah 1936); and Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 216

P. 234 (Utah 1923).
The a~pellant cites as the express grant of authority
to enable it to pass the ordinances in question Sections
17-5-35, Utah Code Annotated (1953) and 17-5-77, Utah Code Annotated (1953).

Section 17-5-35 reads as follows:
[Police, buildin3 and sanitary
regulations--Power to make.]-They may make and enforce with~n
the limits of the county, outslde
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the limits of incorporated cities

an~ t~wns, all such local, police,
bu~ld~ng and sanitary regulations

as are not in conflict with general
l~s.

This statute gives the county the express power to
pass ordinances concerning police regulations, building regulations and sanitary regulations.
This statute can in no way be construed as conferring
on the county the express power to regulate campaign financing.
Further, it is difficult to imagine how the regulation of campaign financing could be construed to be reasonably necessary
much less indispensable in carrying out police, building and
sanitary regulations.
Therefore Cottonwood City Electors,

~·

and the

policy of strict construction found in Ritholz, supra, and
Speth, supra, compels the conclusion that Section 17-5-35,
Utah Code Annotated (1953) does not grant to the county any
power, express or implied, to regulate campaign financing.

At

the very least, upon reading the above statute, it is clear
that reasonable doubt exists as to whether the power has been
conferred upon the county.

Therefore, Nance, supra; Parker,

supra; and Utah Rapid Transit, supra, would require the
county's power to regulate campaign financing be denied.
The appellant also cites Section 17-5-77 as being the
grant of authority enabling the county to regulate campaign
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financing.

Section 17-5-77 reads as follows:
[Ordinances--Power to enact-Penalty for violation] .--The
board of county commissioners may
pass all ordinances and rules and
make all regulations, not repug~ant.to law, necessary for carry~ng ~nto effect or discharging
the powers and duties conferred
by this title, and such as are
necessary and proper to provide
for the safety, and preserve the
~ealth, promote the prosperity,
~mprove the morals, peace and
good order, comfort and convenience of the county and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein;
and may enforce obedience to such
ordinances with such fines or
penalties as the board may deem
proper; provided, that the punishment of any offense shall be by
fine in any sum less than $300
or by imprisonment not to exceed
six months, or by both such fine
and imprisonment.
The board of
county commissioners may pass
ordinances to control air pollution.
The above statute cannot be construed as an express

grant of power to the county to regulate campaign financing.
Further, it is difficult to imagine how the regulation of campaign financing could be construed to be indispensable in providing for the health, safety, welfare, morals, and good order
of the inhabitants.

It should be emphasized that in interpret-

ing the statute the court must strictly construe any attempt
at extending any implied powers.

Ritholz, supra, and~·
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supra.

If the implied power is not reasonably necessary to

carry out the express power, then the ordinance should be
voided, Soeth,

~-

It seems clear that the regulation of

campaign financing by the county is not reasonably necessary
to insure the health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants.
The appellant cites Kusse, supra, as an example for
the types of ordinances that will be upheld under broad grants
of power to municipalities.

However, it should be pointed out

that driving under the influence of alcohol is traditionally
within the police pmvers of local governments.

The ordinance

in Salt Lake City v. Allred, supra, was also clearly a police
power ordinance.

It is difficult to understand how examples

of ordinances regulating prostitution and driving under the
influence as being within the police power of local governments
support the notion that the power to regulate campaign financing could be reasonably implied from the "good order" clause
of Section 17-5-77.
It should also be noted that Kusse, supra, the case
that appellapt so heavily relies on, limits the extension of
implied powers to those powers indispensable to the express
powers, not just merely convenient.
Even if the ordinances in question could be construed
to be reasonably necessary to carry out Section 17-5-77, it is
clear that reasonable doubt exists as to whether the State intended to create this power in the county.

Further, the
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appellant bears the burden of proof to show the power was
granted.

Nance, supra; Parker, supra.

Therefore, :~ance, sup~;

Parker, supra; and Utah Rapid Transit Co., ~· would require
the court to deny the existence of the power and void ·the ordinances in question.
In conclusion, for the county to have the power to
regulate campaign financing,

the county's power must be (l)

specific or (2) necessarily implied from and indispensable to
the carrying out of the express power.

The pov1ers granted to

the county by ·the State can be found in Title 17 of Utah Code
Annotated.

No section in that title authorizes the county to

regulate election financing.

Similarly, no provision of Title

20 entitled "Elections" allows the county to regulate election
financing.

Further, the regulation of election financing is

not necessarily implied from or indispensable to the carrying
out of any of the express powers granted to the county under
Title 17 of Utah Code Annotated (1953).

At the very least,

reasonable doubt exists as to whether the questioned power
exists.

Therefore, the power should be denied and the ROSLCO

1-10-1, et seq., should be voided.
POINT III
SALT LAKE COUNTY ORDINM~CE 1-10-1, ET
SEQ. , ARE IN VIOL<\TION OF ARTICLE I,
SECTION 24 AND ARTICLE XI, SECTION 4 OF
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Article I, Section 24 states:
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[Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature
shall have uniform operation.
Article XI, Section 4 states:
[Uniform county government.]
The Legislature shall establish
a system of County government,
which shall be uniform throughout the State, and by general
laws shall provide for precinct
and township organizations.
The Legislature has enacted uniform statutes to control and regulate the election of public officials.

Those

statutes can be found in Title 20 of Utah Code Annotated (1953)
and Chapters 4 and 5 of Title 17, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
and are discussed more fully in Points I and II of this brief.
There could be no uniform operation and enforcement
of these statutes if this court were to allow local government
to obtain the power to regulate local elections.
counties and 324 cities in the State of Utah.

There are 29

If this court

were to open the door of regulating elections to local governments, there'could potentially be 453 different election
statutes.

This would clearly frustrate the uniform operation

of Utah's general elections laws and would thus violate
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution.
Elections are indispensable to the system of county
government, and elections must be included as part of that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-17-

system.

To allow each of the 29 counties to create their own

election regulations would l·n e ff ec t create 79
d'~f
~
l.c erent systems
of county government throughout the State and thus frustrate
the uniform system of county government.

Therefore, ROSLCO

l-10-l, et seq., are in violation of Article XI, Section 4 of
the Utah Constitution and should be declared void.
In conclusion, to allow each city and county to enact
ordinances regulating local elections would be in violation of
Article I, Section 24 and Article XI, Section 4 of the Utah
Constitution.

Therefore, ROSLCO l-l0-4 and l-l0-8 should be

declared unconstitutional and void.
CONCLUSION
Salt Lake County was totally without power to enact
the ordinances in question.

The State has retained in itself

all power over the regulation of campaign financing and has preempted the entire field of regulating elections and the conduct
of candidates.
The State has not granted to the counties any expressed powers t·o regulate campaign financing.

The regulation

of campaign financing can in no way be implied as indispensable
to any express power granted nor could it even be considered
reasonably necessary to the carrying out of any express power
granted to the counties.

At the very least, there exists reason-

able, even substantial, doubt as to 1"hether or not the State
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intended to create in the counties the right to control campaign financing.

And the appellant has failed in meeting its

burden of proof to show the power exists.

Therefore, the

County had no power to enact the ROSLCO 1-10-1, et seq., and
said ordinances must be declared void.
To allow each of 29 counties and 324 cities to enact
their own election laws would render impossible the uniform
operation of the Utah statutory laws regulating election conduct and thus contrary to the requirements of Article I, Section 24.

Further, to allow each of the 29 counties to create

their own election laws would frustrate the constitutional requirement of uniform systems of county government and therefore violate Article XI, Section 4.
For the foregoing reasons, the respondent respectfully requests that this court declare ROSLCO 1-10-1, et seq.,
unconstitutional and void.
DATED this _ ___,.J."'--~1--"-ti;:.....,.._,___day of l:1arch, 19 79.
Respectfully submitted,

~L Clo"&'•·

1
Phil L. Hansen
HANSEN AND HA.l'l'SE~
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for

~espondent
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